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Economic theory suggests that with a pollution externality and learning spillovers related to renewable energy technologies, the optimal climate policy mix includes an emissions policy and an output subsidy to the learning industry. Instead of output subsidies, feed-in tariffs are often implemented in addition to emissions policies. This paper reveals that this policy mix may theoretically provide for a first-best outcome as well. However, its efficient design may be cumbersome for regulators. An emissions tax must be below the Pigovian level and differentiate between fossil fuels. Moreover, both tax and feed-in tariff must be adapted continuously.

This article provides a review of economic studies analyzing the use of multiple policies - a socalled policy mix - to cope with single pollution problems. To guide and structure the review, an analytical framework is developed and applied. The framework integrates transaction costs into the analysis of pollution problems and policies to overcome them. Moreover, it understands a pollution externality not only as a market failure but more generally as the failure of private governance structures. Based on this insight, two rationales for using a policy mix are identified. First, a policy mix may help to correct for multiple reinforcing failures of private governance structures, such as pollution externalities and technological spillovers. Second, a policy mix can be employed if the implementation of single first-best policies brings about high transaction costs - e.g., when marginal pollution damages are heterogeneous or polluters are unlikely to comply with the policy. For each rationale, the relevant literature is presented. Based on the review, avenues for future research are identified.

The combination of emissions trading and emissions taxes is usually rejected as redundant or inefficient. This conclusion is based on the restrictive assumption that both policies are exclusively meant to control pollution. However, particularly taxes may pursue a variety of other policy objectives as well, such as raising fiscal revenues or promoting equity. Multiple objectives may justify multiple policies. In this case, welfare losses with respect to pollution control may be traded off by benefits from attaining other policy objectives. Consequently, pragmatic policy recommendations have to be based on an in-depth understanding of interactions in the policy mix. This article makes three contributions that are relevant in this respect. (1) The most important factors distorting pollution abatement under the policy mix are identified. This insight is required to estimate the actual extent of inefficiency in controlling pollution, and to compare it with benefits of attaining other objectives of the tax. (2) The policy mix is not only compared to the unrealistic ideal of an efficient single emissions trading scheme but also to a suboptimal heterogeneous emissions tax. It is shown that if the tax is required to address multiple policy objectives, the implementation of an emissions trading scheme in addition may in fact increase the efficiency of pollution control. (3) It is demonstrated that welfare losses can be minimized within a policy mix by modifying emissions trading design.